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The status of parole or probation is one of con-
ditioned liberty.' The purpose of parole and pro-
bation is to permit a person convicted of a crime
to live outside a prison facility so long as that
person observes certain rules during the term of
his sentence.2 In this way, a person may be re-
habilitated and become a constructive member of
society without being incarcerated for his entire
sentence. Although parole and probation were not
within the contemplation of the authors of the
Constitution and Bill of Rights, parole and pro-
bation emerged in the nineteenth century as part
of an egalitarian movement that found rehabilita-
tion a more satisfactory solution to crime and
punishment than the retributive approach of the
Puritan ethic.3 Today, parole and probation are
integral parts of the penological system.
Probation and parole procedures are sharply
distinguishable. In the federal system, a court
grants probation as part of the sentencing process
upon entering a judgment of conviction. A court
in ordering probation may impose a sentence of
* Mr. Fisher, formerly the Legislative Assistant to
the Administrative Office of the United States Courts,
is presently on the staff of the Criminal Division,
United States Department of Justice, Washington,
D.C. The views expressed herein are his own and do not
reflect the policies of the Administrative Office or the
Department of Justice.
I Parole is:
... the release of an offender from a penal or cor-
rectional institution after he has served a portion
of his sentence, under the continued custody of the
state and under conditions that permit his rein-
carceration in the event of misbehavior.
S. RuBnq, H. WEHorEN, G. EDWARDS & S. RosENz-
wEIG, TIm LAW OF Ca mNAL CoRuEcrioN 546 (1963).
Probation is:
... a disposition that allows the convicted offender
to remain free in the community while supervised
by a person who attempts to help him lead a law-
abiding life.
Id. at 176.
See generally, for a discussion of the historical basis
of probation and parole, D. DRESSLER, PRAcricE AN
THEORY or PRoBAZroN AND PARor (2d ed. 1969);
F. F.4nn-n, Tam PAROLE PRocEss (1959); C. NEW-
MAN, SOURCEBOOK ON PROBATION, PAROLE AND PAR-
DONS (3d ed. 1968).2 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
3 Rubin el al., supra note 1, at 176-79, 543-46.
imprisonment and suspend its execution or may
suspend the imposition of sentence.4 It is the court
which judicially sets the conditions, determines
the period of probation (normally up to five
years), modifies probation during its continuance,
transfers probation jurisdiction to another judicial
district when necessary, issues a warrant for the
probationer's arrest on an alleged probation
violation and conducts the probation revocation
hearing.5 The probation officer acts directly for
the court in supervising probation.
6
Parole is another form of conditional release in
the federal system; it rests within the jurisdiction
of the United States Board of Parole, an ad-
ministrative body.7 In the course of the sentencing
process, the court may designate a definite time
minimum for parole eligibility less than the normal
one-third of the maximum term imposed (which
would otherwise obtain as the minimum time).8 The
court may also fix a maximum period to be served
and may specify that the prisoner may become
eligible for parole at such time as the Board of
Parole may determine.9 This type of "indeter-
minate sentence" gives the Board of Parole the
maximum freedom in determining the period of
incarceration. Regardless of the court's precatory
declarations in the sentencing order, the ultimate
decision as to the length of the parole term is left
within the discretion of the Board of Parole.0
The Board of Parole administratively establishes
the parole conditions and any modifications
thereof." Federal probation officers supervise
parolees as well as probationers, but in overseeing
parolees, they are acting for the Department of
Justice and not for the courts.12 It is the Board, or
418 U.S.C. § 3651 (1971).
6 18 U.S.C. §§ 3651, 3653 (1971). Probation for a
juvenile may last for a period not exceeding his mi-
nority. 18 U.S.C. § 5034 (1971).
6 18 U.S.C. §§ 3654, 3655 (1971).
7 18 U.S.C. §§ 4201-10 (1971).
818 U.S.C. § 4208(a)(1) (1971). The standard mini-
mal time for parole eligibility is set forth in 18 U.S.C.
§ 4202 (1971).
9 18 U.S.C. § 4208(a)(2) (1971).
10 18 U.S.C. § 4203 (1971).
11 d.
18 U.S.C. § 3655 (1971) (final paragraph).
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a member thereof, which issues a warrant for a
parole violation.' Although the two procedures,
one judicial (probation) and the other adminis ra-
tive (parole), follow different patterns of pro-
cedure, both procedures involve one status-the
conditional liberty of an offender who is free to
live his life within orderly restrictions. Failure to
observe parole or probation conditions may pro-
duce the same result at the conclusion of a revoca-
tion proceeding-the loss of liberty. 4
Obviously, probation or parole revocation is a
serious matter for the probationer or parolee.
Upon forfeiture of his conditional liberty, he will
be returned to prison, often to serve the remainder
of his sentence. Recent Supreme Court decisions16
have recognized that, in view of the serious con-
sequences which flow from a finding that an
offender has violated his probation or parole, due
process protections must be provided to the
offender during the revocation proceeding. This
article will review those decisions, compare them
with existing rights provided to probationers and
parolees at revocation hearings in the federal
system, and make reference to several proposals
to reform parole and probation revocation pro-
cedures.
H. The Anomalous Status of Conditioned Liberty
The status of the probationer or parolee is
difficult to analyze. Any analysis must scrutinize
the basic rationale for supervising a convicted
man, for monitoring his way of life and for im-
posing restraints on his lifestyle that would be
considered unwarranted intrusions into the
ordinary citizen's privacy. Beyond such analysis,
however, it is necessary to justify the procedures
which support the termination of an offender's
liberty when he breaches the conditions of his
release. Courts have relied on several theories to
restrict the parolee's or probationer's right to due
process protections. Courts commonly refer to
these rationales as the grace theory, the contract
1318 U.S.C. § 4205 (1971).
" The Supreme Court recognized in Gagnon v. Scar-
pelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973), that in determining the
procedural guarantees mandated by the due process
clause for revocation hearings, probation and parole
revocations would be treated in the same manner since,
although neither procedure is part of a criminal prose-
cution, both result in the loss of liberty. Thus, in dis-
cussing the due process protections to be provided an
offender in a revocation proceeding, the rights of the
probationer and parolee will be considered together.
Is Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973); Mor-
rissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
theory, the custody theory and the parens patriae
theory.
The grace theory provides that the prisoner's
release is not a right to which he is entitled, but
rather is a privilege, a merciful act by the court or
by the parole board.16 Through the grace theory,
courts have justified the denial of minimal legal
protections to probationers and parolees. Since
parole or probation is a gift, it may be limited
with conditions imposed by the grantor of parole
or probation.
The contract theory arises from the fact that
offenders must sign forms specifying the conditions
of their liberty. This theory holds that an agree-
ment similar to any business contract exists be-
tween the prisoner and the state. The contract
theory asserts that acceptance of the contract
requirements by the prisoner estops him from
complaining about its terms, since the prisoner
was free to reject the restrictions on his liberty
which were offered to him.
17
Probationers are in the custody of the court and
parolees are in the custody of the Board of Parole. 8
Chief Justice, then judge, Burger set forth the
custody theory in Hyser v. Reed,x9
A paroled prisoner can hardly be regarded as a
"free" man; he has already lost his freedom by due
process of law and, while paroled, he is still a con-
victed prisoner whose tentatively assumed progress
toward rehabilitation is in a sense being "field
tested". Thus it is hardly helpful to compare his
rights in that posture with his rights before he was
duly convicted. 20
The custody theory restricts the prisoner's
status to that of a "quasi-prisoner" and shields
him from judicial review on non-constitutional
16 The grace theory derives from justice Cardozo's
dictum in Escoe v. Zerbst, 195 U.S. 490, 492 (1935), that
"... [p]robation or suspension of sentence comes as
an act of grace." See Fuller v. State, 122 Ala. 32, 26 So.
146 (1899), Curtis v. Bennett, 256 Iowa 1164, 131
N.W.2d 1 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 958 (1965);
People v. Marks, 350 Mich. 495, 65 N.W.2d 698 (1954).
"7 See United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 149
(1833); United States ex rel. Randazzo v. Follette, 282
F. Supp. 10, 15-16 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), a.ff'd, 418 F.2d
1319 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 984 (1971);
Ex parte Edwards, 78 Okla. Crim. 213, 219-20, 146
P.2d 311, 314 (1944).
18Thompson v. United States Board of Parole, 375
U.S. 957 (1963); Padilla v. Lynch, 398 F.2d 481 (9th
Cir. 1968); Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir.),
cerl. denied, 375 U.S. 957 (1963); Dillingham v. United
States, 76 F.2d 35 (5th Cir. 1935).
19318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 957
(1963).
20 Id. at 235.
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grounds. A corollary of the custody theory is the
parens patriae theory. The parens patriae theory
holds that the goals of the Board of Parole or
court are in union with the goals of the parolee or
probationer. Both parties desire the offender's
rehabilitation; therefore, judicial examination of
procedures employed against the probationer or
parolee becomes unnecessary 2'
The above theories which support the denial of
due process protections to a probationer or parolee
have been eroded to a great degree by judicial
decisions. The Supreme Court in Morrissey v.
Brewer2 rejected the entire right/privilege rationale
which supported denial of due process in parole
revocation hearings. The Court recognized that
parole revocation is not part of a criminal prosecu-
tion and that parole revocation deprives an in-
dividual not of absolute liberty but only of the
conditional liberty which hinges on compliance
with parole restrictions. However, the Court
recognized that "... . this Court now has rejected
the concept that constitutional rights turn upon
whether a governmental benefit is characterized
as a 'right' or as a 'privilege'. " 28 In addition, the
Court has determined that the loss which the
individual will suffer must control the extent to
which procedural protections will be provided for
the individual.24 Parole and probation have be-
come accepted parts of the criminal justice system.
To view probation or parole as an "act of grace"
is to ignore the correctional goals of the penological
system.
In addition to the downfall of the right/privilege
distinction, many courts have questioned the
constructive custody theory announced in Hyser v.
Reed.25 These courts indicate that there is not a
complete loss of due process protections upon a
criminal conviction. 2 The custody concept also
21 See generally concerning theories relied upon by
courts to justify the denial of due process rights to
probationers and parolees, Van Dyke, Parole Revocation
Hearings in California, 59 CAm. L. REv. 1215, 1243-
54 (1971); Comment, Parole: A Critique of Its Legal
Foundations and Conditions, 38 N.Y.U.L. REv. 702
(1963); Comment, The Parole System, 120 U. PA. L.
REv. 282, 286-95 (1971).
" 408 U.S. 471 (1972). See Joyce v. Strassheim, 242
Ill. 359, 90 N.E. 118 (1909).
1 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782, n.4 (1973);
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971);
Hewitt v. North Carolina, 415 F.2d 1316 (4th Cir.
1969).
2 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
25 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 957
(1963).
2 6See, e.g., Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 576
(8th Cir. 1968); Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863
conflicts directly with the practice of forfeiting
release time upon violation of a parole or proba-
tion condition. If one sentenced or reincarcerated
for a violation of his conditioned liberty agreement
receives no credit for his time spent on probation
or parole, how can it be said that he was "in
custody" during the period of conditional liberty?
The parens patriae theory, an alternative basis
for denying parolees counsel at a revocation hearing
in Hyser is also subject to question. In re GaulP7
contains the basic theoretical attack upon the
view that, in correctional situations, the govern-
ment and the individual pursue identical goals.
In Gault, the Court overturned the use of informal
juvenile court proceedings and required that
specific due process protections be provided to a
juvenile in proceedings which might lead to the
juvenile's commitment. The Supreme Court
accepted arguendo the respondent's contention
that procedural guarantees were unnecessary be-
cause the juvenile was in the state's custody for
benevolent reasons. However, the Court de-
termined that "... unbridled discretion, however
benevolently motivated, is... a poor substitute
for principle and procedure." 28 The argument
against providing procedural protections to
probationers and parolees is comparable to the
argument offered by state officials in Gault. There
is no reason that the Gault rationale, denying
effect to the parens patriae theory, ought not apply
to the use of that argument in parole and proba-
tion revocation proceedings.
The basic flaw in the aforementioned contract
theory is that there is no bilateral negotiation of
terms and that the person seeking release does
not have the option to refuse restrictions on his
liberty. The court in Hahn v. Burke29 noted that
" ... probation is in fact not a contract. The
probationer does not enter into the agreement on
an equal status with the state." 80
Having reviewed the validity of the theories
which support the denial of due process pro-
tections to individuals who face revocation of
their probations or paroles, it is necessary to
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), rev'd in part, modified in part sub nom.
Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971).
27387 U.S. 1 (1967).
RId. at 18.
29 430 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S.
933 (1971).
31 Id. at 104. See Burns v. United States, 287 U.S.
216 (1932); Weihofen, Revoking Parole, Probation or




investigate the extent to which the erosion of
those theories has caused an expansion of due
process protections to probationers and parolees
in revocation proceedings. A review of statutory
procedures required in the federal system and of
constitutional protections mandated by the
Supreme Court will indicate how far government
has advanced in providing procedural safeguards
for a person on the verge of forfeiting his con-
ditioned liberty.
llE. Morrissey and Gagnon
In Morrissey v. Brewer" and Gagnon v. Scar-
pelli,n2 the Supreme Court announced the due
process protections which an individual must be
granted in a revocation proceeding. The due proc-
ess requirements set forth by the Court serves to
flesh out the federal statutes relating to parole and
probation and to specify the minimal procedural
protections which the states must provide to
parolees and probationers in their revocation
hearings. Both decisions employ a balancing of
interests test to determine the procedural pro-
tections to be provided an individual without
imposing an unacceptable burden on the govern-
mental body granting the hearing."
The issue in Morrissey was whether the due
process clause as applied to the states by the
fourteenth amendment "... requires that a State
afford an individual some opportunity to be heard
prior to revoking his parole." 4 After discussing
the role of parole in the criminal justice system
and rejecting the theory that constitutional rights
turn on whether the government benefit provided
to a citizen is either a right or a privilege,"' the
Court determined that parole revocation was not
a part of a criminal prosecution and, thus, a state
31408 U.S: 471 (1972). See Cohen, A Comment on
Morrissey v. Brewer, 8 CmE. L. BuLL. 616 (1972); Note,
Morrissey v. Brewer, 22 CATH. U.L. Rxv. 715 (1973);
Note, Parolee's Right Under the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to an Opportunity to Be Heard
Prior to Revoking His Parole, 11 DUQUESNE L. REv.
693 (1973); Note, An Endorsement of Due Process Re-
form in Parole Revocation: Morrissey v. Brewer, 6 Loy.
L. RFv. 157 (1973).
"411 U.S. 778 (1973).
3 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 787-90 (1973);
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1972).
u Petitioner Morrissey served one year on a charge
of drawing false checks and was paroled. Seven months
after parole, authorities arrested and jailed petitioner
for parole violation. The Iowa Parole Board revoked
petitioner's parole on the basis of the parole officer's
written report. Petitioner asserted that he received no
hearing prior to the revocation of his parole. Morrissey
v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 472-73 (1972).
Is Id. at 477-81.
need not provide the full panoply of rights due a
criminal defendant."
However, Chief Justice Burger, writing for the
Court, stated that the termination of a parolee's
conditioned liberty does result in a "grievous
loss" and falls under the protection of the due
process clause. The revocation process must be
orderly even though it might be considered in-
formal when compared to a criminal prosecution.
The Court perceived two critical stages in the
revocation process which required the imposition
of some procedural guarantees.
Chief Justice Burger viewed the arrest and
preliminary hearing as the first critical stage of
revocation procedure, since there might be a
significant time lapse between arrest and a final
revocation decision. In addition, the parolee may
be arrested at a place distant from a state in-
stitution.3 For these reasons, the Court found
that due process required that an inquiry be
conducted as soon after arrest as was possible
while evidence and sources were readily available.
The hearing would determine whether there was
probable cause to believe that the parolee had
violated parole conditions. Since the failure of a
parolee may involve a failure on the part of the
parole officer to insure compliance with parole
restrictions, due process required that an officer
not personally involved with the parolee make the
probable cause determination."
The Court decided that certain procedural
protections should be provided the parolee at the
preliminary hearing stage. The parolee must
receive notice that a hearing will be held to de-
termine whether there is probable cause to be-
lieve he has committed a parole violation. The
notice must allege acts which constitute parole
violations. At the hearing, the parolee must have
the opportunity to appear and to speak in his
defense; "... he may bring letters, documents, or
individuals who can give relevant information to
the hearing officer." 10 The parolee may also
request that persons who have provided informa-
tion which supports the revocation action be
questioned in his presence.4' The hearing officer
"1 Id. at 480.
7Id. at 482.
IsId. at 485.
9 The person who determines whether there exists
probable cause that a parole violation has been com-
mitted need not be a judicial officer. Id. at 486.
40 Id. at 487.
4 1 Id. The hearing officer need not subject a witness
to confrontation if the witness would be endangered by
having his identity exposed.
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has the duty to make a summary of the documents
and responses which emerged at the preliminary
hearing. Based on the summary, the officer should
determine whether there is probable cause to send
the parolee before the Board for a final revocation
decision. Although the finding need not be formal,
the, officer must "... state the reasons for his
determination and indicate the evidence he re-
lied on...." 4 2
The Court required many of the same pro-
cedural protections at the revocation hearing,
the second stage of the revocation process, if the
parolee desires that a hearing be held. The revoca-
tion hearing, during which contested facts are
considered, results in a revocation determination.
The parolee must be provided an opportunity to
demonstrate, if he can, that he did not violate
parole conditions; or, if he did violate his parole,
that mitigating circumstances exist which suggest
that the violation does not warrant revocation. 2
Noting that each state must design its own
code of procedure, the Court set forth the mini-
mum requirements of due process that must be
afforded to the parolee:
(a) a written notice of the claimed violations of
parole; (b) disclosure to the parolee of the evidence
against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person
and to present witnesses and documentary evidence,
(d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse
witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically
finds good cause for not allowing confrontation);
(e) a "neutral and detached" hearing body such as
a traditional parole board, the members of which
need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) a
written statement by the fact finders as to the
evidence relied on and the reasons for revoking
parole."
In setting forth procedural requirements for the
revocation process, the Court cautioned that it
had no intention of equating the proceeding with
a criminal prosecution. The Court viewed the
revocation process as "... a narrow inquiry; the
process should be flexible enough to consider
evidence including letters, affidavits, and other
materials that would not be admissible in an
adversary criminal trial." 41
In Gagnon v. Scarpelli,46 the Supreme Court
42 Id., quoting Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271
(1970).
11408 U.S. at 488.44 Id. at 488-89.
4 Id. at 489.
46 411 U.S. 778 (1973). In Gagnon, petitioner received
decided an issue which it declined to consider in
Morrissey, the right of a probationer or parolee
to appointed counsel at a revocation proceeding.
Justice Powell, the author of the Court's opinion,
recognized that the purpose of probation and
parole is to rehabiltat offenders and to return
them to society as soon as possible. In reviewing
the functions of the parole officer, the Court
found that the officer's role required that he both
supervise the offender's rehabilitation and recom-
mend revocation of probation when, in his broad
discretion, such a course of action seemed neces-
sary. Of necessity, a probation officer who recom-
mends revocation compromises his role as counselor
to the probationer.
When the officer's and probationer's views
concerning the alleged violation differ, due process
requires a resolution of the divergent views be-
fore there can be an informed revocation de-
cision. 1 Both the parolee or probationer and the
state have interests in an accurate determination
of whether a parole or probation violation has
occurred. The individual does not wish to lose his
freedom without careful consideration of his
conduct and the state does not wish to endanger
the safety of the community by allowing an in-
dividual, who violates legitimate correctional
restrictions, to remain free. justice Powell noted
that the procedural protections announced in
Morrissey serve as substantial protection against
erroneous revocation determinations.
The Court believed, however, that "...the
effectiveness of the rights guaranteed by Morrissey
may in some circumstances depend on the use of
skills which the probationer or parolee is unlikely
to possess." 4 Although the revocation proceed-
ings lack formality, the probationer or parolee
a suspended sentence on a charge of armed robbery.
Petitioner's probation was revoked without a hearing
after petitioner was convicted of burglary. Petitioner
contended on appeal that he gave the confession on
which his second conviction was based under duress and
that the denial of both a probation revocation hearing
and the right to counsel at that hearing constituted
violations of due process. Id. at 779-80.
The Court held that Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471 (1972), required that petitioner be provided a pre-
liminary and final revocation hearing with the pro-
cedural protections announced in that case. 411 U.S. at
782. In discussing the right to counsel issue, the Court
pointed out that petitioner did not attempt to retain
counsel and, therefore, the Court in Morrissey refused
to decide the issue of whether an individual had the
right to retained counsel at a revocation proceeding. Id.
at 783 n.6.
47411 U.S. at 785.
48 Id. at 786.
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might experience difficulty in presenting his
version of the facts in situations which require the
examination or cross-examination of witnesses or
the presentation of complex documentary evi-
dence. However, the Court found that, while
situations would arise in which the need for the
expertise of counsel would exist, there was no
constitutional requirement that counsel be pro-
vided in all revocation proceedings.
49
The Court noted that the introduction of
counsel into revocation proceedings would sub-
stantially alter the nature of the proceeding. The
body making the revocation determination would
surrender its traditional role as a fact finder and
assume the role of a judge at trial less concerned
with the offender's rehabilitative needs. As a result
of the adversary nature of the proceedings,
"... the hearing body may be less tolerant of
marginal deviant behavior and feel more pressure
to reincarcerate (rather) than to continue non-
punitive rehabilitation." "
In light of the narrow range of situations in
which an individual would require the assistance
of counsel, necessitating changes in the particulars
of the revocation hearing, the Court held that
due process did not require that informal revoca-
tion procedures be abandoned entirely. Instead,
the Court adopted a case by case approach similar
to the method announced in Betts v. Brady" for
determining when the' right to the assistance of
counsel would attach in a revocation proceeding.
The Court left to the governmental body re-
sponsible for administering parole and probation
revocation the burden of determining on a case
by case basis the circumstances which required
the appointment of counsel.n The Court's analysis
49 The Court noted that, in many cases, the proba-
tioner or parolee had been convicted or had admitted
committing a crime at the time of the revocation hear-
ing. In such instances, the Court determined that there
was no need to appoint counsel to present evidence in
mitigation on behalf of the offender. Id. at 787. See
generally, Sklar, Law and Practice in Probation and
Parole Revocation Hearings, 55 J. Canr. L.C. & P.S.
175, 192-93 (1964).
For other Supreme Court decisions denying the
right to counsel, see Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682
(1972); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
50 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 788 (1973).
51316 U.S. 455 (1942). The Court in Gagnon asserted
that there are "critical" differences between criminal
trials and revocation proceedings. The Court found
that the right to counsel at revocation hearings arose
not from the nature of the proceeding but rather from
the peculiar circumstances of a case. 411 U. S. at 788-89.
E411 U.S. at 789. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(c) (1971) pro-
vides for the appointment of counsel for indigent de-
fendants in federal criminal cases: "A defendant for
concluded that it would not be possible to formu-
late a precise set of guidelines to determine when
due process would require the appointment of
counsel.
The Court, while refusing to announce con-
stitutional standards which would govern the
appointment of counsel, did suggest that, in
certain fact situations, a state must carefully
consider the appointment of counsel. Such cir-
cumstances include (1) when the parolee or pro-
bationer claims that he has not committed the
alleged violation of the conditions upon which he
is at liberty or (2), if the violation is a matter of
public record, when there are compelling reasons
which justified or mitigated the violation and
when the reasons mitigating against revocation
are complex and difficult to present. The Court
stressed that the individual's ability to speak
effectively for himself should be weighed by the
state agency.n Finally, the Court required that
the reasons supporting a refusal to appoint counsel
be set forth in the record whenever a request for
counsel is denied.M
In rejecting the circuit court determination that
the Constitution required the states to provide
counsel for indigents in all revocation proceedings,
the Court determined that such a rule ".... would
impose direct costs and serious collateral dis-
advantages without regard to the need or likelihood
in a particular case for a constructive contribution
by counsel." 51 If counsel were appointed in all
cases, the state would, of necessity, be represented
by counsel. Furthermore, the Court determined
that since criminal prosecutions differ from
revocation proceedings, the sixth amendment, as
interpreted in Gideon v. Wainwright" and Arger-
singer v. Hamlin does not require the application
whom counsel is appointed shall be represented at
every stage of the proceedings from his initial appear-
ance before a United States magistrate through appeal."
It is now mandatory that the assistance of counsel be
offered a probationer in federal probation revocation
proceedings. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(b) (1971). Title 18 of
the United States Code is silent as to whether a parolee
is entitled to appointed counsel at a federal parole
revocation proceeding. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4201-10 (1971).
1411 U.S. at 789.
u Id. at 791.
1 Id. at 787.
56 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
57 407 U.S. 25 (1972). In Argersinger, the Court
extended the right to appointment of counsel to any
situation wherein the defendant could be imprisoned
as a result of a conviction. See also Comment, Arger-
singer v. Hamlin: For Better or For Worse?, 64 J. Cans.
L. & C. 290 (1973).
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of a per se rule regarding the appointment of
counsel in revocation proceedings.
The Supreme Court's analysis and decision in
Gagnon is contrary to that of the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit in United States ex rel.
Bey v. Connecticut State Board of .ParoleYs The
court in Bey held that it was a violation of due
process for Connecticut to revoke the petitioner's
parole without affording him the right to counsel.
An analysis of the reasoning by the court in Bey
may serve to challenge the rationale relied upon
by the Supreme Court in Gagnon. In deciding the
right to counsel issue, the court considered three
factors: (1) petitioner's stake in the parole revoca-
tion proceeding; (2) the importance to the fairness
of the proceeding of the right to counsel; and (3)
the anticipatable effect on state institutions of
recognizing the right to counsel.5 9
The court, in discussing the first factor, de-
termined that petitioner's interest in the pro-
ceeding was the loss of his conditioned freedom.
Comparing Bey's plight to that of petitioner in
Mempa v. Rhay, 0 the court found that both
petitioners risked the loss of "... a status that is
- 443 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot, 404 U.S.
879 (1971). Other cases preceding Gagnon which dis-
cussed the right to counsel in revocation proceedings
include United States ex rel. Martinez v. Aldredge,
468 F.2d 684 (3d Cir. 1972) (denying right to counsel);
Flint v. Hocker, 462 F.2d 590 (9th Cir. 1972) (requiring
counsel at probation revocation proceeding deemed an
"integral" part of the sentencing process); Dennis v.
California Adult Authority, 456 F.2d 1240 (9th Cir.
1972) (erecting case by case approach to right to coun-
sel); Barber v. Nelson, 451 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1971)
(requiring counsel at proceeding wherein probation is
revoked and an original sentence is imposed); Bearden
v. South Carolina, 443 F.2d 1090 (4th Cir. 1971)
(denying right to counsel); Serviss v. Mosely, 430 F.2d
1287 (10th Cir. 1971) (right to counsel when violation
is contested); Shaw v. Henderson, 430 F.2d 1116 (5th
Cir. 1970) (denying right to counsel); Alverez v. Turner,
422 F.2d 214 (10th Cir. 1970) (requiring right to coun-
sel); Rose v. Haskins, 388 F.2d 91, cert. denied, 392
U.S. 946 (1968) (denying right to counsel); Williams v.
Dunbar, 377 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1967) (denying parolee
the rights to counsel, summon witnesses and cross-
examine adverse witnesses); Brown v. Warden, 351
F.2d 564, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1028 (1965) (denying
right to counsel); Gaskins v. Kennedy, 350 F.2d 311
(4th Cir. 1965) (denying right to counsel); Welsh v.
United States, 348 F.2d 885 (6th Cir. 1965) (denying
right to counsel).
59 443 F.2d at 1086.
o 389 U.S. 128 (1967). In Mempa, the Court held
that an indigent probationer must be represented by
appointed counsel at a combined revocation and sen-
tencing hearing. The Court reasoned that counsel must
be provided ". . . at every stage of a criminal proceed-
ing where substantial rights of the accused may be
affected .... " Id. at 134. The Court determined that
sentencing was such a stage even when accomplished
at a probation revocation proceeding.
considerably more desirable than that of a prisoner.
When revocation is threatened, they all have the
same interest in maintaining that status." 61 The
court also stated that a parole revocation will mar
the parolee's employment opportunities and
standing in the community upon his ultimate
release from imprisonment. The court's conclusion
was that substantial rights were involved in the
revocation proceeding, rights which required
the assistance of counsel.
The second factor investigated by the Bey court
concerned the lawyer's role in a parole revocation
proceeding. The court recognized that a revocation
proceeding will often involve the application of
knowledge from experience in several disciplines
such as psychology, sociology and penology. In
this phase of the revocation hearing, the court
found no need for a lawyer's special skills. 2 How-
ever, the hearing board must determine that
events between the prisoner's release and the
hearing justify the forfeiture of the prisoner's
conditioned liberty. Whether Bey would lose his
liberty depended upon a narrow interpretation of a
specific factual situation. The court determined
that the lawyer's training qualified him "1... to
analyze and organize for the benefit of an im-
partial tribunal evidentiary matter bearing on the
occurence of nonoccurence as well as the sig-
nificance of past events." 1 The lawyer may be
able to point to mitigating circumstances and
facts not revealed in the parole officer's report. At
the very least, a lawyer could emphasize facts
favorable to his client or suggest disciplinary
11 United States ex rd. Bey v. Connecticut State
Board of Parole, 443 F.2d 1079, 1087 (2d Cir.), vacated
as moot, 404 U.S. 879 (1971), quoting Rose v. Haskins,
388 F.2d 91, 103 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 946
(1968) (Celebrezze, J., dissenting).
6 443 F.2d at 1087.
63 Id. See Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967),
where the Court suggested that a formal hearing with
counsel is required in any proceeding affecting the
present or future liberty of any of its citizens.
A hearing on revocation becomes an adversary pro-
ceeding once the parolee disputes the charges against
him. As the court stated in Menechino v. Warden, 27
N.Y.2d 376, 380, 267 N.E.2d 238, 241, 318 N.Y.S.2d
449, 453-54 (1970):
Can there be, in such a case, any reasonable doubt
as to the value of counsel in developing and prob-
ing factual and legal situations which may deter-
mine on which side of the prison walls appellant
will be residing?
Even in a non-adversary situation, there remains a
need for counsel to articulate the parolee's worthiness
for parole. Bearden v. South Carolina, 443 F.2d 1090,
1094 (4th Cir. 1971); Martin v. United States, 182




procedures short of outright parole revocation.
However, the court cautioned that trial tactics
permitted in an adversary proceeding should not
be used. The role of counsel is to facilitate, not
impede, the flow of information to the Board. The
court concluded that the "... [Bloard may take
appropriate measures to assure that the counsel
appreciates his limited role and presents his
client's case accordingly." "
The final factor which the court considered in
Bey was the impact of granting the right to counsel
upon the state's parole system. The court found
that the state had failed to demonstrate that
providing counsel to develop and evaluate relevant
events bearing on a revocation decision would
inhibit the parole process. 5 The court believed
that the presence of counsel would aid the flow of
pertinent information and would guard against
distortion and error. Further, there would be no
effect upon the relationship between the parolee
and the parole officer since the right to counsel
would not arise until revocation of the parole
became an imminent possibility." The court dis-
missed the contention that the presence of counsel
would result in fewer paroles. Such a suggestion
improperly assumed that Parole Board members
would "... react vindictively to spite the legal
process .... " and deny paroles to those who
would normally receive them.Y In summary, the
reasoning in Bey indicates that an individual's
possible loss of liberty outweighs the burden on
"443 F.2d at 1089. The ninth circuit in Williams v.
Dunbar, 377 F.2d 505, 506 (9th Cir. 1967), found that
allowing counsel to appear at a parole revocation hear-
ing might impede the parole process. However, Michi-
gan allows retained counsel and many due process
protections at parole revocation hearings and retains a
very high parole rate. McH. STAT. Awx. § 28.2310(1)
(1972); Warren v. Michigan Parole Board, 23 Mich.
App. 754, 179 N.W.2d 664 (1970). See generally, Sklar,
supra note 49.
65 A court has suggested that requiring the appoint-
ment of counsel in revocation proceedings would over-
come the resources of the bar. In re Tucker, 5 Cal. 3d
171, 182, 486 P.2d 657, 663, 95 Cal. Rptr. 761, 767
(1971). However, Mr. Justice Brennan's concurrence
in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), suggested
that an increased demand for lawyers could be satis-
fied. He indicated that increased enrollment in law
schools together with supervised student participation
in criminal matters could "... be expected to make a
significant contribution, quantitatively and qualita-
tively, to representation of the poor in many areas
.... 1" Id. at 41 (Brennan, J., concurring).
6" 443 F.2d at 1088.
6 See Rose v. Haskins, 388 F.2d 91, 102 n. 15 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 946 (1968) (Celebrezze, J.,
dissenting); Sklar, supra note 49 at 175 n.157.
the state to provide counsel for indigents at
revocation hearings.
While the Court in Gagnon did provide for the
right to counsel when circumstances so required,
the Bels v. Brady approach" to the right to
counsel must be considered subject to criticism.
Over the twenty-one year period during which
Belts stood, the Supreme Court was required to
review numerous fact situations to determine
whether due process required the appointment of
counsel. In Townsend v. Burke," the Court held
that counsel must be provided at a sentencing
after a plea of guilty when false assumptions
were made concerning petitioner's criminal record.
In that case, the Court felt that counsel could
make certain that conviction or sentence was not
based on erroneous information.
In 1957, the Court in Moore v. Michigan0 re-
quired that counsel be appointed at a hearing
following the entry of a guilty plea when the
defendant had not "... intelligently and under-
standingly" waived counsel before pleading
guilty, Next, the Court in Hamilton v. Alabaman
mandated that counsel be appointed at an ar-
raignment although the defendant entered a plea
of not guilty. Due process required the appoint-
ment of counsel in the Alabama proceeding since
certain defenses had to be raised or abandoned at
that stage of the prosecution. Finally, the Court
overruled the special circumstances test of Belts
in Gideon v. Wainwrigh wherein the Court held
that the sixth amendment as applied to the states
through the fourteenth amendment necessitated
an absolute right to appointment of counsel in
felony cases. In light of the treatment given Belts
by the Court, it is understandable that the Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Hewitt v.
- 316 U.S. 455 (1942). In Betts, the Court held that
the due process clause did not require appointment of
counsel for indigents in criminal cases. The Court
adopted the following test:
Asserted denial [of due process] is to be tested by
an appraisal of the totality of facts in a given case.
That which may, in one setting, constitute a denial
of fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal
sense of justice, may, in other circumstances, and
in light of other considerations, fall short of such
denial.
Id. at 462. See J. Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright: The
"Art" of Overruling in Tnx Suizxm COURT REVIEW,
1963 (P. Kurland ed. 1963); Kamisar, Bels v. Brady
Twenty Years Later: The Right to Counsel and Due
Process Values, 61 MacH. L. REv. 219 (1962).
"9 334 U.S. 736 (1948).
70 355 U.S. 155 (1957).
71368 U.S. 52 (1961).
- 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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North CarolinaP rejected the Belts approach in
requiring that counsel be appointed for indigents
in all probation revocation proceedings,
... if we were to adopt a case by case approach,
articulation of where the line should be drawn be-
tween those who should have been supplied with
counsel and those who may be denied counsel,
would be most difficult if not impossible. Even the
most superficially frivolous proceeding may reveal
to competent counsel procedural or substantive ir-
regularities which require correction in order to
safeguard the interests of a probationer . 4
The Supreme Court encountered difficulty in
applying the Betts approach to criminal cases in
which the accused's liberty was at stake. Whether
the Court will be able to sustain a case by case
approach in cases in which the conditioned liberty
of a probationer or parolee is at issue remains
open to question. It can be argued that due process
demands that counsel be provided at revocation
hearings since "... society has further interest in
treating the parolee (or probationer) with basic
fairness: a fair treatment in parole revocations
will enhance the chanc4 of rehabilitation by avoid-
ing reactions to arbitrariness." 75
The Supreme Court rejects the view that a
revocation hearing is a step in the criminal process
which requires furnishing the defendant with full
procedural protections. As a result, the probationer
or parolee will not receive the full benefit of the
fourth amendment protection against unreason-
able searches and seizures.76 Although the law
- 415 F.2d 1316 (4th Cir. 1969).741d. at 1325. The logic supporting the view ex-
pressed in Hewitt remains despite the Supreme Court's
opinion in Gagnon. The fourth circuit adopted a case
by case approach to the appointment of counsel at
parole revocation hearings in Bearden v. South Carolina,
433 F.2d 1091 (4th Cir. 1971).
71 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 484 Z1972).78 In Morrissey, the Court indicated that, while the
due process clause required a two stage revocation
proceeding, it did not mandate the imposition of rigid
rules concerning the admissibility of evidence. The
revocation process should be flexible enough to admit
evidence which would ordinarily be excluded from a
criminal proceeding. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471, 489 (1972).
Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949), pro-
vides further support for the view that flexibility
will govern proceedings outside the criminal process.
In Williams, the Court affirmed the sentence of a trial
judge who overruled a jury recommendation of life im-
prisonent and imposed a death sentence after con-
dering presentencing information. In sanctioning this
exercise of judicial discretion in the consideration of
presentence information, the Court held that due proc-
ess did not require the application of strict rules of
evidence in sentencing proceedings.
surrounding the application of the exclusionary
rulew to parole and probation revocation pro-
ceedings is not completely settled, the general
view is expressed in United States ex rel. Sperling v.
Fitzpatrick.7' In Sperling, the petitioner contested
the use of illegally seized evidence to prove a
parole violation. The court held that the ex-
clusionary rule was not applicable in parole
revocation hearings. The court grounded its
decision on the fact that the Parole Board has
wide discretion, consistent with due process, to
use reliable evidence in making its revocation
determination. The appellant did not dispute that
the illegally seized evidence constituted proof of a
parole violation.
79
In United States ex rel. Lombardino v. Heyd,
80
the court upheld the probation revocation even
though the evidence on which the revocation was
based was illegally seized, requiring dismissal of
the criminal charge. Conceding that probationers
are entitled to basic constitutional rights, the
court perceived the issue to be the extent of those
rights. The court refused to equate an accused's
rights in a criminal prosecution and an individual's
rights in a revocation proceeding.
At present, the degree of proof necessary for
probation revocation is less than that required for
a criminal conviction in which proof of guilt
must exist beyond a reasonable doubt.s Typically,
See generally White, The Fourth Amendment Rights of
Parolees and Probationers, 31 U. Prr. L. REv. 167
(1969); Note, Extending Search and Seizure Protection
to Parolees in California, 22 STAx. L. Rnv. 129 (1969).
7 The exclusionary concept as applied in criminal
proceedings is set forth in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206
(1960); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
78426 F.2d 1161 (2d Cir. 1970).
79 The concurring opinions of Judges Lumbard and
Kaufman, id. at 1164, 1166, indicated that the goals of
the parole system could be best achieved without a
strict application of the exclusionary rule.
The First Circuit Court of Appeals adopted the
Sperling rule in Baxter v. Davis, 450 F.2d 459 (1st Cir.
1971). In Baxter, two grand jury indictments were
returned against the parolee, but the county district
attorney declined to prosecute. The court held that
the Parole Board could consider the findings of probable
cause and the return of indictments against the parolee
in a revocation proceeding.
However, in Cotlle v. Wainwright, 338 F. Supp. 819
(M.D. Fla. 1972), the district court excluded from evi-
dence in a parole revocation hearing, two North Caro-
lina convictions on the ground that the indigent parolee
was not represented by counsel at the trials.
80318 F. Supp. 648 (E.D. La. 1970), a.ff'd, 438 F.2d
1027 (5th Cir. 1971). See also United States v. Hill,
447 F.2d 817 (7th Cir. 1971).
81 United States v. D'Amato, 429 F.2d 1284, 1286
(3d Cir. 1970); United States v. Nagelberg, 413 F.2d
708, 709 (2d Cir. 1969).
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a district judge in the federal system "... need
only be reasonably satisfied that terms of proba-
tion have been violated and the sole question on
review is whether he abused his discretion in re-
voking probation." 2 The rationale for a lesser
standard of proof is the same as in other areas
where full due process protections are denied to a
parolee or probationer-"... a revocation pro-
ceeding is not a trial of a criminal case." 1 In
probation revocation proceedings, the Parole
Board wields broad discretion in revoking a condi-
tional release." Although a Parole Board must
comply with procedural rights established by
statute and by Morrissey, a review court will not
intervene unless a board has dearly abused its
discretion in revoking a parole or mandatory-
release.85 Indeed, judicial decisions seem to indicate
that the Parole Board's judgment is virtually
unreviewable.86
IV. Present Revocation Procedures in the
Federal System
Although probation and parole are vital facets
of the criminal justice system, to this time Congress
has determined not to legislatively prescribe
specific parole and probation revocation pro-
cedures. Congress, as part of its general program
of regulating prisoners in the federal system and
of preparing them for re-entry into society, estab-
lished the United States Board of Parole and
provided it with the authority to develop pro-
cedures relating to parole revocationY Since the
enabling legislation requires, only that an arrested
parolee be given the opportunity to appear before
"the Board, a member thereof, or an examiner
designated by the Board," " parole revocation is
basically an administrative procedure.
The Board of Parole has the sole authority to
issue a warrant for the retaking of a parolee.89
2 Amaya v. Beto, 424 F.2d 363, 364 (5th Cir. 1970).
8 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972).81 Parole revocation hearings are informal and flexible
proceedings. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489
(1972). See also, concerning a parole board's discretion
to revoke parole Earnest v. Mosely, 426 F.2d 466, 468
(10th Cir. 19705; Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225, 234
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 957 (1963).
85 Earnest v. Mosely, 426 F.2d 466, 468 (10th Cir.
1970); Clark v. Stevens, 291 F.2d 388 (6th Cir. 1961);
Freedman v. Looney, 210 F.2d 56 (10th Cir. 1954).8 6 Shelton v. United States Board of Parole, 388 F.2d
567, 576 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d
225, 240 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 957 (1963).
7 18 U.S.C. §§ 4201-10 (1971). See generally Note,
Parole Revocation in the Federal System, 56 Go. L.J.
705 (1968).
88 18 U.S.C. § 4207 (1971).
89 18 U.S.C. § 4205 (1971).
The warrant issues when a member of the Board
believes that the facts alleged in the complaint, 0
if proved, demonstrate "satisfactory evidence" of
a parole violation.9'
After the arrest, the Probation Officers Manual"8
sets forth the procedures to be followed.
The probation officer, acting not as a judicial officer,
but as an agent of the Justice Department, inter-
views the parolee. The parolee receives two forms
to be completed and signed. C.J.A. Form 22 re-
quests him to list those charges contained in the
Parole Board warrant that he wishes to contest,
those he declines to contest, and any convictions
received since the Board granted mandatory release
or parole to him. This form also advises him that he
may apply to the United States District Court for
the appointment of an attorney to represent him at
his revocation hearing. "f the United States mag-
istrate or the court determine that the interests of
justice so require" and if he is found to be indigent,
the request for appointment of counsel will be
granted.93
The alleged violater is then asked to complete
the Preliminary Interview and Revocation Hear-
ing Form" which offers him one of three choices:
postponement of the preliminary interview, a
local revocation hearing, or a hearing at a federal
institution if he is not released after the initial
interview.
The preliminary interview will be postponed by
the hearing officer if the alleged violator requests
additional time to secure the presence of an
attorney and/or witnesses at the interview. The
preliminary interview will also be delayed if the
90 Private citizens, the parolee's family members and
police are sources of information concerning parole
violations. Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225, 240, cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 957 (1963). The parole officer will
bring to the attention of the Board information con-
cerning a parolee's failure to conform to technical con-
ditions imposed by the Board. Parole Revocation in the
Federal System, supra note 87 at 709.
91 28 C.F.R. § 2.35 (19675. UNrED STATES BoARD
or PA.orn, RuLts at 22 (1965). The issuance of an
arrest warrant based on a criminal charge is sufficient
evidence to support the issuance of a parole warrant.
Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 957 (1963).
2 UNITED STATES PROBATION OrxCERS MANUAI,
Probation Division, Administrative Office of the United
States Courts, §§ 8.41-46 (1973).
93 CJ.A. Fopam 22 (February, 1971); Statement of
Parolee on Mandatory Release Concerning Appoint-
ment of Counsel Under Criminal Justice Act. The
alleged offender may retain his own counsel to repre-
sent him at the preliminary interview and any subse-
quent revocation hearing.
94 
PRELmmNARY INTERvIEw AND REvOCATION HAR-
ING Fopm (Parole Form F-2, Rev. June, 1973).
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parole officer requests the appearance of adverse
witnesses to be cross-examined by the parolee,
provided that he has not been convicted of a new
criminal charge and that he denies all charges of
parole violation. 5 The adverse witness should be
produced upon a determination by the hearing
officer that the witness would face no risk of harm
if his identity were disclosed.s6 During the pre-
liminary interview, the accused may present
documents and voluntary witnesses on his behalf,
and cross-examine adverse witnesses.Y At the
conclusion of the preliminary hearing, the hearing
officer must decide whether or not there is probable
cause that the alleged offender violated his parole
conditions. A finding of probable cause will
necessitate a revocation hearing.
Th6 revocation hearing will be conducted locally
upon completion of the initial interview if the
parolee has denied violation of his conditioned
liberty agreement and if he has not been convicted
of a new violation while under supervision. The
Board then may conduct a revocation hearing in
the community where the alleged violation took
place, if the accused requests the services of an
attorney or the attendance of adverse witnesses.98
In addition, the Preliminary Interview and
Revocation Hearing Form provides, "Where
appropriate, a local revocation hearing may take
the place of a preliminary interview." 19 The
meaning of this sentence is unclear. Will the
preliminary hearing to determine probable cause
be consolidated with the revocation hearing to
determine a de facto violation? Or will the pre-
liminary hearing be eliminated in some circum-
stances?
The accused will be returned to a federal in-
stitution for his revocation hearing, if, after the
preliminary interview, the Parole Board has not
ordered release and the alleged violator admits or
does not deny that he is guilty of violating the
conditions of release, or if he has been convicted
of violating a law since his release. Even though
he denies guilt and has no new convictions, the
accused will be returned to a federal institution,
if he requests that his revocation hearing be held
there, and if he desires to waive his right to cross-
examine adverse witnesses. 00
95 Id.
96 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 487 (1972).
" PRELImqARY INTERviEw AND REvocATION HEAR-
ING FoRm (Parole Form F-2, Rev. June, 1973).
99 Id.
100 UNITED STATES PROBATION OYFICERS MANUAL,
If the prisoner refuses to sign the Revocation
Election Hearing Form, he has not waived the
right to a hearing with an attorney or the right
to present witnesses. The probation officer simply
notes on the form that the parolee "was advised
of his rights but refused to sign the form." 1 01
The parole officer then prepares a summary of the
preliminary interview, informs the prisoner of the
alleged violations and records the parolee's com-
ments. This summary is sent to the Parole Board.
The final step of the revocation process is a
hearing before the Parole Board,07 which decides
whether the parole should be revoked or modified.
The revocation hearing is normally non-adversarial
in nature. The decision to revoke or to modify
must be based on "sufficient evidence" and on the
Board's belief that revocation relates to whether
the parolee is a good risk to remain in the com-
munity. 3 The procedural safeguards established
by the Morrissey'0 4 and Gagnon °5 decisions must
be complied with throughout the preliminary
interview and revocation hearing proceedings.
Any determination resulting from a parole revoca-
tion hearing may be appealed to a regional and a
national parole board.0°
Probation revocation procedures in the federal
criminal justice system derive from separate
statutory authority0 7 A probation officer may
arrest a probationer for cause without a warrant
or a court of proper jurisdiction may issue a
warrant for arrest for alleged violation of proba-
tion.z' s Then, enforcement authorities are ordered
Probation Division, Administrative Office of the United
States Courts, § 8.46 (1973). In a situation in which
the parolee admits the alleged violations, and does not
request that witnesses appear on his behalf at the pre-
liminary interview, but does request that witnesses be
interviewed who might present mitigating information
to the Parole Board, the probation officer should make
a "reasonable effort" to obtain this information by
personal interview or by mail and to present it to the
Board. Id.
101 Id.
10218 U.S.C. § 4207 (1971).
103 Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 957 (1963); Moore v. Reid, 246 F.2d
654 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
M 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
105 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
106 As of October 1, 1973, a parolee in Parole Board
Region 1 may appeal a parole board revocation deter-
mination to the Regional Director and then to the Na-
tional Appellate Board. Region 1 is comprised of the
following states: Maine, New Hampshire, Massachu-
setts, Vermont, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York,
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland,
Virginia, West Virginia and the District of Columbia.
28 C.F.R. 184, §§ 2.20 2 21 2.23, 2.43 (1973).




to bring the probationer "as speedily as possible"
before the court of the district having jurisdiction
over him. The court then decides whether to
revoke the probation and to require the proba-
tioner to serve the sentence which was imposed at
trial, or a lesser sentence, or, if imposition of
sentence was suspended, to impose any sentence
which could have been originally imposed.'09
The Administrative Office of the United States
Courts has revised the rather informal probation
revocation procedures to incorporate the require-
ments of Morrissey and Gagnon.'0 The preliminary
hearing must be held before a federal judge or
magistrate. The following procedural rights are
incorporated at this stage: 1) notice of the alleged
violations of probation including a statement of
the allegations relied on for revocation; 2) the
opportunity to appear personally; 3) the op-
portunity to present witnesses in his own behalf;
4) the right to confront and cross-examine ad-
verse witnesses unless the hearing officer de-
termines that disclosure of a witness' identity
would subject him to risk of harm; 5) a written
report of the hearing including a determination
as to whether there is probable cause to hold the
probationer for the final revocation hearing; 6)
the appointment of counsel at the preliminary
hearing to represent the probationer at the final
revocation hearing; and 7) the right to bail at the
discretion of the judicial officer pursuant to Rule
32(f) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure."
Two additional rights are provided the accused
at the final revocation hearing: disclosure of the
evidence against him and a written statement by
the fact finders as to the evidence relied on and
the reasons for revoking probation, should it be
revoked."
V. Proposed Reforms of Revocation Procedures
In recent years, the unfairness which exists in
present probation and parole procedures has be-
come evident to certain commentators and legis-
lators. President Johnson's Commission on Law
109 Id.
10 See "Memorandum to All Chief Probation Officers
and Officers in Charge of Units," August 27, 1973,
issued by the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts.
I" FED. R. Cinn. P 32(f), provides:
The court shall not revoke probation except after
a hearing at which the defendant shall be present
and apprised of the grounds on which such action
is proposed. The defendant may be admitted to
bail pending such hearing.
12 See "Memorandum," supra note 110.
Enforcement and Administration of Justice noted
that:
[T]he correctional strategy that presently seems to
hold the greatest promise, based on social science
theory and limited research, is that of reintegrating
the offender into the community. A key element in
this strategy is to deal with problems in their social
context, which means in the interaction of the of-
fender and the community. It also means avoiding
as much as possible the isolating and labeling ef-
fects of commitment to an institution. There is
little doubt that the goals of reintegration are
futhered much more readily by working with an
offender in the community rather than by incar-
cerating him.'"
The American Bar Association Advisory Com-
mittee on Sentencing and Review supports the
above conception of corrections. As Draft of
Standards Relating to Probation"i recommends
sweeping changes in the probation system., The
Advisory Committee offers a new definition of
probation: "... any sentence which does not in-
volve confinement and which is conditional in the
sense that the defendant remains subject for a
period of time to the control of the court." "I The
new definition eliminates the differences in ter-
minology relating to the imposition of a sentence
and suspension of its execution versus the sus-
pension of the imposition of sentence. The ABA
report views probation not as a substitute for a
sentence but rather as a sentence in itself."6
Probation is a sentence, to the ABA Committee,
designed to achieve a specific end-the orderly
reintegration of an individual into society by
imposing restrictions on his activities. That the
probationer may be subjected to imprisonment
upon a violation of his probation does not necessi-
tate a definition of "probation" which includes
such a possibility. Adverse consequences may
result from a broad definition of probation. If a
jurisdiction requires that a sentence be imposed
and then suspended before probation may be
granted, the imposed term may limit sentencing
discretion upon a subsequent probation violation.
The Advisory Committee believed that a manda-
13 Tna PREsiENT's CoinUssio ON LAW EmroncE-
MENT AND AmnmusTRATIon or JUSTICE, TAsE FORCE
RPORT: CoRECTIoNs 28 (1967).
14 AmEicAN BAR ASSOCIATION PRoj cT ON STAND-
ARDS IFOR CRMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING
TO PROBATION (1970) [hereinafter referred to as ABA
PROBATION].
15 ABA PROBATION 9.
16 Id. at 25.
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tory sentence upon probation revocation is un-
desirable and should not be a part of the probation
revocation process." 7
There is another reason for amending the
definition of "probation." When an offender is
sentenced to probation with a suspended period
of incarceration, he is loathe to appeal his con-
viction, however riddled with error the record
may be. In effect, the case is open-ended until the
point of revocation is finally reached. There is no
need to include a period of suspended imprison-
ment among the conditions of probation.
There are two benefits to be derived from
granting probation without a suspended period of
imprisonment. First, the probation need not be
considered a "conviction," carrying with it the
"ex-con" stigma that is a death blow for re-
habilitation in many cases.ns Second, the time of
probation revocation rather than the time when
probation commences is the appropriate moment
for setting a prison sentence since the offender's
personality may have changed in the interim.
The Advisory Committee recommend a reforma-
tion in probation assumptions to facilitate the use
of probation in appropriate cases because:
(1) it maximizes the liberty of the individual while
at the same time vindicating the authority of the
law and effectively protecting the public from fur-
ther violations of the law; (2) it affirmatively pro-
motes the rehabilitation of the offender by con-
tinuing normal community contacts; (3) it avoids
the negative and frequently stultifying effects of
confinement which often severely and unnecessarily
complicate the reintegration of the offender into
the community; (4) it greatly reduces the financial
cost to the public treasury of an effective correc-
tional system; (5) it minimizes the impact of the
conviction upon innocent dependents of the of-
fender."'
Two bills,1"° introduced during the second
session of the 92d Congress, propose to apply a
similarly enlightened view toward the parole
system. H.R. 13118 provides for the establishment
of a National Parole Institute,'m the purpose of
which is to serve as a national clearing house of
117Id.
18 New legislation relating to simple possession of
soft drugs is a device for avoiding the onus of a final
conviction. 21 U.S.C. § 844(b) (1972).
19 ABA PROBATION 27.
"' H.R. 13118, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) (intro-
duced by Representative Kastenmeier); S. 3993, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) (introduced by Senator Burdick).
I H.R. 13118, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 4232 (1972).
information and a lobbying organization. It would
sponsor research in new parole techniques, recom-
mend innovations in the parole process to all
levels of government, encourage competent people
to enter the parole field, and promote the em-
ployment of ex-offenders. The bill would also
establish an independent Board of Parole' in the
executive branch to coordinate national parole
policy. S. 3993 provides for the creation of an
Advisory Corrections Council 3 and a United
States Parole Commission" in the Department
of Justice. The Council would suggest innovations
in the administration of criminal justice and the
Parole Commission would perform functions
similar to the aforementioned National Parole
Institute.
H.R. 13118 and S. 3993 provide, in most cases,
for release on parole after an offender has served
one-third of a definite term or terms of over one
hundred and eighty days or after serving ten to
fifteen years of a life sentence or of a sentence of
more than forty-five years. Release should be
granted unless the Board finds that the individual's
liberty is incompatible with the welfare of society
or that he will not abide by the conditions of
parole."' Both bills provide that the conditions
of parole be reasonably related to the prisoner's
previous conduct and present situation, that
liberty be deprived only where "necessary for the
protection of the public welfare," and that the
conditions be "sufficiently specific to serve as a
guide to supervision and conduct." " 6
The ABA Advisory Committee recommends
that the conditions imposed by the court on a
probationer aid him in living within the bounds
of the law. "They should be reasonably related to
his rehabilitation and not unduly restrictive of
his liberty or incompatible with his freedom of
religion. They should not be so vague or ambiguous
as to give no real guidance." 127 The conditions
should be sufficiently specific "so that probation
officers do not in fact establish them." The Ad-
visory Committee also recommends that the
probationer be allowed to petition the court for a.
clarification or change of conditions. This is
important as the success of probation as a cor-
1' H.R. 13118, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 4201 (1972).
m S. 3993, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 5002 (1972).
"4S. 3993, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 4201 (1972).
125 H.R. 13118, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 4205 (1972);
S. 3993, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 4202 (1972).
6 H.R. 13118, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 4211 (1972);
S. 3993, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 4202 (1972).
m ABA PROBATION 44-45.
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rectional procedure is closely related to the
"flexibility within which it is permitted to oper-
ate.2"128
Proposals for change include modifications in
present revocation procedures. The ABA Ad-
visory Committee took exception to the federal
statute which permitted a probation officer to
arrest a probationer for cause, wherever found,
without a warrant." 9 The Advisory Committee
believed that warrants based on probable cause
should be required to support a probationer's
arrest unless the probation violation involved the
commission of another crime or other standards
for arrest without a warrant have been met. In
addition, the Committee would eliminate the
authority of probation officers to arrest proba-
tioners.'"
The ABA Advisory Committee concluded that
a probationer must account for any alleged
violation of probation conditions. Although such
violations would widen the scope of conduct which
would permit an arrest, an alleged probation
violation ought not support a relaxation of pro-
tections against the abuse of ordinary arrest
procedures."' Relaxing the standards on which
an arrest is based neither instills a respect for law
in the probationer nor aids him in leading a law-
abiding life, which is the purpose of probation.
While the Advisory Committee accepted the view
that a probation officer must have the power to
"bring in" the probationer, the officer's dual role
as law enforcer and counselor to the probationer
caused the Committee to conclude that the officer
ought not have the power to formally arrest his
charge. The officer's authority is more properly
exercised in securing issuance of the warrant;
normal arresting personnel should execute the
warrant.
H.R. 13118 and S. 3993 provide that a parolee
be retaken upon issuance of a warrant by the
Board of Parole, the current practice. A United
States marshal customarily executes the warrant.
1n
Both bills allow for the execution of the warrant
by any officer of any federal penal or correctional
institution, or any federal officer authorized to
serve criminal process within the United States.
33
' Id. at 48.
ni18 U.S.C. § 3653 (1971).
110 ABA PROBATION 59-60.
' Id. at 61.
L' UNITED STATES PROBATION OFFICERS MANUAL
§ 8.44 (1973).
I- H.R. 13118, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 4217(d) (1972);
S. 3993, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 4206 (1972).
The two bills provide for different parole re-
vocation hearing procedures. H.R. 13118 provides
for the reincarceration of the parolee if, after a
preliminary hearing, the Board has substantial
reason to believe that the offender will not appear
for his subsequent revocation hearing." The
parolee is not reimprisoned if he has been granted
bail or otherwise released by the court having
jurisdiction over the offense constituting the
alleged parole violation. The preliminary hearing
should be held as soon as possible after the parolee
has been retaken.
S. 3993 does not provide for a preliminary
hearing simlai to that of H.R. 13118; it states
that a parolee, shall be granted a hearing before
a United States magistrate as soon as possible
after being retaken on a warrant.8 5 Unlike the
existing statute,'36 retained or appointed counsel
will be provided to the parolee. In addition, the
parolee may present witnesses on his behalf and
cross-examine adverse witnesses. The magistrate
then prepares a summary and makes a recom-
mendation to the Parole Commission based on
facts presented at the hearing. The Commission
must make a recommendation concerning each
alleged violation. Such determination may consist
of one of the following: a dismissal of revocation
proceedings; a reprimand; an alteration of parole
conditions; a referral to a residential community
treatment center for all or part of the remainder
of the original sentence; a formal revocation of
probation; or "any other action deemed necessary
for successful rehabilitation of the violator, and
which promotes the ends of justice." 17
The revocation hearing under H.R. 13118 is
held not before a magistrate, but before a member
of the Parole Board."' The same rights are granted
to the parolee as under S. 3993. Should the Board
find that the parolee did violate a condition of his
parole, it must inform him within ten days of the
hearing. The Board's determination may consist
essentially of the same alternatives available to the
Parole Commission under S. 399311 Should the
parolee's alleged violation consist of being charged
with a criminal offense, H.R. 13118 stipulates
that no hearing shall be held, but that the Parole
Board will render a determination on revocation
14 H.R. 13118, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 4217(f) (1972).316 S. 3993, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 4207(a) (1972).
12 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1971).
2" S. 3993, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 4207 (1972).
I- H.R. 13118, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 4218(d) (1972).
239H.R. 13118, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 4218(e) (1972).
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after final judgment by the trial court having
jurisdiction over the criminal offense.140 Acquittal
will result in dismissing the warrant, while con-
viction is prima fade evidence of the violation of
the conditions of parole by the parolee.'4' A
prisoner whose parole is revoked and who is
subject to having his parole "good time" forfeited
or to being assigned to reside in or participate in
the program of a residential community treatment
center or similar facility may, according to H.R.
13118, file an appeal within ten days after the
Board's determination.'42 At least five members
of the Board will consider the appeal and the
parolee has the right to consult an attorney
concerning his appeal. Finally, H.R. 13118 pro-
vides for judicial review of Parole Board de-
cisions.'4
The ABA Advisory Committee proposal con-
cernmg probation revocation procedures is similar
to the proposed legislation concerning parole
revocations. The Committee supports the view
expressed in H.R. 13118 that a revocation de-
termination must be postponed until disposition
of the criminal charge in those situations in which
a revocation proceeding depends solely on the
commission of another crime." The ABA pro-
posal would permit the probation court in its
discretion to detain the probationer without bail
pending disposition of the criminal charge. An
indictment would constitute probable cause which
would support detention.145 The Committee would
find it "unseemly" for a probation court to revoke
probation when the trial court acquits the proba-
tioner of the charge. However, action on the
parole violation need not be deferred when the




I- H.R. 13118, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 4219(a) (1972).14 M.R, 13118, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 4221 (1972).
14 The ABA Advisory Committee believed that post-
ponement was necessary:
The relative informality of a probation revocation
proceeding, as compared to the trial of an original
criminal charge, underlines the danger. Relaxation
of rules of admissibility of evidence, the absence
of a jury, a lesser burden of proof-factors such as
these can lead to an abuse of the proceeding by
basing revocation upon a new criminal offense
when the offense could not be proved in an ordi-
nary criminal trial. Additional complexity is intro-
duced by the position in which the probationer is
put as regards his privilege against self-incrimina-
tion: a revocation proceeding before trial of the
charge on which it is based well could compromise
the assertion of this fundamental constitutional
right.
ABA PROBATION 63.
1 Id. at 62-63.
criminal charge "involves an incidental violation
of the conditions of the probation." 46
In addition to the specific protections which
Supreme Court decisions provide to the parolee,
the Committee included the right to representa-
tion by retained or appointed counsel, proof of a
violation by a preponderance of the evidence if
the facts of the violation are contested, a record
of the proceedings, and the right to appeal an
order revoking parole.0 4 The Committee con-
sidered these procedural rights essential to "assure
the integrity of the revocation proceedings as a
truth-seeking inquiry." 14
VI. conclusion
The United States Constitution does not
specifically provide for the application of due
process of law to parole and probation revocation
proceedings. These forms of conditional liberty
developed in the nineteenth century from the
egalitarian movement that considered rehabilita-
tion a more effective solution to crime than retribu-
tion.
The conditioned liberty status has been offered
as a privilege, an act of grace by the government,
not a right to which an individual is entitled.
Numerous theories have been formulated to ex-
plain the relationship between the prisoner and
the state: the concepts of grace, contract, custody
and parens patriae. Upon analysis these theories
appear inconsistent, at odds with one another, and
unrealistic in relation to the purpose of probation
and parole-the orderly reintegration of the indi-
vidual into society. Although the logic of each
theory is different, the result upon applying each
theory is the same-the insulation of the individ-
ual from the procedural protections available in
criminal proceedings.
The Supreme Court in Morrissey and Gagnon has
required that parolees and probationers be pro-
vided with limited due process rights in revocation
proceedings. In Morrissey, the Court established
certain procedural safeguards in the parole revo-
cation process. In Gagnon, the Court applied
these safeguards to probation revocation, and
granted to both parolees and probationers the
right to counsel in limited circumstances. The
federal government has revised its established
procedures accordingly.
116 Id. at 65.
147 Id.
1 Id. at 67.
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The Gagnon decision, however, may well raise
more questions than it answers. The Supreme
Court's return to the special circumstances test of
Betts v. Brady seems a philosophical retreat to the
early development of due process of law. It also
places on the Court the task of determining which
circumstances warrant the right to counsel. Betts
placed this same burden on the Court more than
thirty years ago.
The Court's refusal to grant the right to counsel
in all contested probation and parole revocation
proceedings is based on the determination that
probation and parole revocation are not part of
the criminal prosecution process. However, the
loss of liberty is threatened in these proceedings as
much as in a criminal prosecution. The fact that
the liberty is "conditioned" makes it no less a
substantive right than the liberty at stake in any
criminal trial. The consequence of a revocation
decision is much more like the consequence of a
finding of guilty in a criminal trial than the result
of an ordinary administrative proceeding.
The goal of both probation and parole is the
orderly reintegration of the individual into society.
The recommendations of the ABA Advisory Com-
mittee on Sentencing and those embodied in H.R.
13118 and S. 3993 of the 92d Congress present
standards of due process that protect the rights
of the individual while allowing the state to regu-
late his activities. Defining probation as a sen-
tence, thus eliminating the concept of a suspended
period of imprisonment, granting the right to re-
tained or appointed counsel, allowing the opera-
tion of the exclusionary rule, proving a contested
violation beyond a reasonable doubt or by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, and securing judicial
review of orders revoking conditioned liberty
would make a substantial contribution to the
factual inquiry-whether the' alleged offender did
indeed commit a violation of his conditioned lib-
erty agreement.
In Morrissey and Gagnon, the Supreme Court an-
nounced its view of the due process protections to
be provided in revocation proceedings. Therefore,
the duty to provide the full range of procedural
protections necessary to protect the liberty of a
parolee or probationer passes to the Congress and
to the state legislatures.
19741
